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ABSTRACT
This article is aimed at evaluating different scenarios of the personal income tax re-
form in Russia, intended to replace the flat tax scale with a progressive scale. To test 
the expediency of this plan, the authors present a three-parameter model to calculate 
the expected effects from different scenarios. The model is based on the idea that the 
best project should simultaneously reduce the assets ratio, increase budgetary rev-
enue and should minimize the risk of the reform’s non-fulfillment. The research relies 
on the statistical data on the population’s income distribution. To neutralize distor-
tions, the authors calibrated the initial statistical data on distribution in the high-in-
come group (tenth decile) of the population. The risk of non-fulfillment was assessed 
through an expert poll. The proposed model was used to test four reform projects, 
which were developed by the Government, the Communist Party, the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party, and the party “Just Russia”. It was found that the best project, according 
to the three parameters applied in the analysis, was the governmental project, which 
preserves the flat income scale and raises the rate from 13 to 15%. It was also shown 
that the other projects dramatically overestimated the growth in tax revenues due to 
incorrect calculations of the distribution of the population’s incomes in the tenth de-
cile group. Thus, at the moment there are no rational alternatives to the governmental 
project of the reform and there is also no consensus between the Russian opposition 
parties and the expert community, which prevents them from working together to 
design a single reform project. It is concluded that at present Russia needs a balanced 
project which would include multi-step adjustments of the personal income tax over 
an extended period of time – ten years or more. 
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АННОТАЦИЯ 
Целью статьи является оценка различных проектов реформирования подоход-
ного налога в Российской Федерации. Для обсуждения целесообразности отме-
ны плоской шкалы подоходного налога и ее замены на прогрессивную шкалу 
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авторы предлагают трехпараметрическую модель, позволяющую проводить 
сценарные расчеты ожидаемых эффектов от различных вариантов налоговой 
реформы. Главная идея модели состоит в том, что лучшим является такой про-
ект реформы, который дает лучший интегральный результат с учетом воз-
можного уменьшения коэффициента фондов, роста доходов бюджета и риска 
невыполнения проекта реформы. Информационным массивом исследования 
являются статистические данные о распределении доходов населения. Для 
нейтрализации искажений выполнена калибровка исходных статистических 
данных относительно распределения высокодоходной группы (десятого деци-
ля) населения. Риск невыполнения проекта оценивался на основе экспертного 
опроса. Разработанная модель была применена для проверки четырех проек-
тов реформы подоходного налога: проекта Правительства Российской Феде-
рации; проекта Коммунистической партии Российской Федерации; проекта 
Либерально-демократической партии России; проекта партии «Справедливая 
Россия». Апробация модели показала, что лучшим по трем параметрам являет-
ся проект Правительства РФ, предлагающий сохранить плоскую шкалу налога 
и повысить ставку с 13 до 15%. Также было выявлено, что предложения всех 
политический партий, выступающих за введение прогрессивной шкалы подо-
ходного налога в России, кратно завышают рост налоговых поступлений от вне-
дрения своих предложений из-за неправильного учета распределения доходов 
населения в десятой децильной группе. Все это свидетельствует об отсутствии 
рационального альтернативного предложения по внедрению прогрессивной 
шкалы подоходного налога, а также об отсутствии в России в настоящее время 
консенсуса между оппозиционными политическими партиями и экспертным 
сообществом, что не позволяет им выступить с единым и хорошо проработан-
ным проектом реформы подоходного налогообложения. Сделан вывод о том, 
что на данном этапе Россия нуждается в сбалансированном проекте введения 
прогрессивного подоходного налога с учетом многошаговых корректировок 
налоговой шкалы в течение длительного времени (10 лет и более).
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА 
прогрессивный подоходный налог, плоская шкала подоходного налога, рефор-
ма налога, социальное неравенство, доходы бюджета
1. Introduction
The establishment of market econo-
my in Russia led to predictable income 
stratification of society. Social conflicts 
are becoming more intense and attract a 
lot of attention while the introduction of 
international sanctions limited the coun-
try’s budgetary revenues. Both prob-
lems could, at least partially, be solved 
through the introduction of a progressive 
personal income tax scale, which in Rus-
sia has been a widely discussed issue in 
the last two years. 
The analysis shows that society is di-
vided into two camps on the issue of intro-
ducing the progressive personal income 
tax. On the one hand, the State Duma re-
ceives constant proposals to introduce this 
fiscal instrument, on the other hand, the 
Russian government unfailingly refuses 
to back up these initiatives. Thus, in 2017 
three political fractions supported the 
draft law to introduce a progressive indi-
vidual income tax scale: the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), 
the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR) and the Party “Just Russia” (PJR). 
The draft laws proposed by these parties 
differed only in details – in tax rates and 
the gradation of income. However, the 
government did not support these initia-
tives and in the end, the Duma rejected 
these draft laws. It should be mentioned 
that “Just Russia” submitted drafts for dis-
cussion in the Duma over ten times, with 
invariably negative results. In this case, it 
is impossible to overlook the fact that all 
projects to introduce the progressive per-
sonal income tax were always approved 
by the Parliament of the Kabardino-Balkar 
Republic. Thus, we can conclude that there 
is, so far, no political consensus in Russian 
society regarding the progressive person-
al impact tax. The situation got worse in 
2018, after the pension reform had been 
initiated. From that moment, it became 
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clear that the government chooses to solve 
budgetary problems at the expense of the 
poor, rather than rich, members of society. 
At present there are four projects of 
the reform proposed by the three political 
fractions (PJR, LDPR and CPRF) support-
ing the introduction of the progressive 
scale of income tax and the one proposed 
by the government, which would like to 
keep the flat scale while simultaneously 
raising its rate from 13% to 15%. Each of 
the scenarios is characterized by different 
risks of non-fulfillment. The aim of this 
article is to develop standard methodol-
ogy for the economic evaluation of tax re-
form projects and selection of the optimal 
one. Three groups of risks will be taken 
into consideration – fiscal (additional rev-
enue for the budget), social (changing the 
income disparity), and behavioral (the 
degree of project feasibility). The calcula-
tions should illustrate the functionality of 
the developed methodology so that they 
could be used in the future to examine 
other reform projects. 
For our analysis of the problems asso-
ciated with the tax reform it is important 
to remember that we are going to discuss 
the personal income tax, although this tax 
is not currently used in Russia and is sub-
stituted by its distant equivalent – the so-
called income tax on natural persons. The 
difference between them lies in the fact 
that the personal income tax takes into ac-
count the per capita family tax, while the 
income tax on natural persons is limited 
to the income of a specific person; in other 
aspects these two taxes are functionally 
identical. To ensure a smooth transition 
from the Russian income tax on natural 
persons to the internationally accepted 
personal income tax, we first need to en-
sure comparability of these taxes. 
2. Analytical overview of the problem 
Various aspects of social inequality 
and income tax are discussed in numerous 
publications; however, for the purposes of 
this article, it will be sufficient to point out 
several key ideas to show how this study 
fits into the general research trend. 
First and foremost, it should be noted 
that the majority of countries with a low 
share of the personal income tax in their 
budgetary revenues are also characterized 
by a low level of income, especially wages 
[1–4]. Although Russian people’s incomes 
have grown considerably in the last two 
decades, they still have not reached the 
level at which the personal income tax can 
become the fiscal dominant of the budge-
tary system. From this point of view, in 
Russia no adjustments to the system of 
the personal income tax can make the role 
of this tax more significant, and this fact 
should be taken into consideration while 
reforming the Russian tax system. 
It should be borne in mind that the 
transition of Russia to the flat scale of the 
personal income tax happened at the same 
time as similar reforms in other countries, 
for example, Sweden. Such political deci-
sions mainly stemmed from the under-
standing that, due to a large number of 
special regimes and benefits, this tax had 
probably lost much of its former effective-
ness, especially regarding its redistribu-
tion functions [5–7]. Econometric calcula-
tions in the following years showed that 
this tax is mainly oriented at leveling the 
wages, while its potential for the redistri-
bution of taxable incomes of high-income 
groups is, on the whole, low [8].
An important milestone in the re-
search of the personal income tax was 
the introduction of models of individual 
tax evasion, in which the function of util-
ity depended on the size of individual 
“wealth”. One of the first such models was 
proposed as far back as in 1972 [9], and it 
was followed by a stream of publications 
discussing its specific aspects [10; 11]. 
With reference to Russia, it was shown 
that the personal income tax played a 
modest role in the tax system due to vari-
ous tax evasion mechanisms used by high 
income taxpayers [8]. 
In the past decade in Russia, many 
studies have put emphasis on analyti-
cal description of the fiscal effects and 
the effects of social inequality. Thus, for 
example, the distribution of income in 
population groups was approximated 
using the Verhulst differential equation, 
which made it possible to obtain an ana-
lytical expression for the assets ratios, Gini 
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index and the coefficient of specific polar 
incomes, as well as to determine that there 
were no significant changes in the struc-
ture of income distribution in 2009–2015 
[12]. Another study applied a model of 
the income distribution function in Rus-
sia with the use of the two-parameter 
long-normal distribution, which allowed 
the authors to evaluate the assets ratio in 
1998 at the level of 17.6 for the country as 
a whole, while for Moscow it was at the 
breathtakingly high level of 46.0 [13].
More advanced recent research has 
been mainly aimed at modeling the pro-
gressive scale of the personal income tax. 
This trend was largely determined by the 
fact that the modern theory of optimal 
income taxation, which goes back to the 
works of J. Mirrlees [14], does not provide 
any comprehensive answers to the ques-
tion about the optimal progression degree 
for the personal income tax scale or the 
size of top rates and the range of their vari-
ations. Furthermore, the obtained analyti-
cal results are very sensitive to the initial 
suppositions and assumptions, which in 
their turn, according to some researchers, 
are themselves weakly grounded and in-
sufficiently substantiated [15]. Therefore, 
in 2011, R.O. Smirnov put forward a game 
model of constructing the progressive scale 
of the personal income tax using the dif-
ferential “coupling equation” as the main 
condition for the model’s solution [16]. 
The results he obtained made it possible 
to reduce the problem of selecting the top 
rates of the tax and the grades of the scale 
to the problem of choosing five entrance 
parameters for this model, which could be 
easily determined on the basis of statistical 
data. For the case of long-normal distribu-
tion of income, the progressive scale of the 
personal income tax was determined as 
fractions of the mathematical expectation, 
and the percentage (effect) of this type of 
tax from the aggregate tax revenue was ex-
pressed through the parameter of disper-
sion in the distribution [17].
Theoretical research in the sphere of 
taxation made it possible to determine 
that a small change of prices caused by the 
introduction of the personal income tax 
leads to a considerable change (deteriora-
tion) of the standard of living [18]. Further 
modeling of the economic effects from the 
introduction of the progressive personal 
income tax allowed the researchers to de-
rive the function of the redistribution of 
the tax burden and to compare multiple 
variants of the non-linear tax [19].
As for the flat personal income tax 
scale, it was shown that the instruments 
ensuring its progressiveness are the stan-
dard benefits. However, the incomplete 
and delayed indexation of the benefits of 
the income tax on natural persons and the 
abolition of the standard benefit led to a 
decrease in the progressiveness of the per-
sonal income tax in the decade following 
its introduction. The emerging effect of 
“cold progression” lead to additional tax-
ing of the sums which should have been 
removed from the taxable base due to the 
social purpose of the taxes [20].
In recent years, some ultramodern 
instrumental approaches to studying the 
income tax phenomenon have been de-
veloped, including analysis of the dynam-
ics of income tax evasion based on the 
standard model of statistical mechanics, 
namely, the Ising model of ferromagne-
tism [21]. This approach falls within the 
framework of econophysics and makes it 
possible to examine a heterogeneous so-
ciety whose agents are characterized by a 
certain social temperature and connection 
with the external fields that govern their 
behavior. This new approach to modeling 
allows us to analyze big communities con-
sisting of at least four different interacting 
types of agents. 
Research based on the agent-oriented 
models and aimed at studying behavioral 
and social aspects of taxation has also re-
cently gained popularity. Thus, there are 
works aimed at determining the role of 
professional affiliation in the observance 
of tax legislation (tax discipline) and the 
conditions of auditing (checking) a fixed 
number of taxpayers for each type of pro-
fessions [22]. 
There are also some model applica-
tions of the imitation type used to assess 
different scenarios of the income tax re-
form. One of them is the MIKMOD-ESt 
model, which belongs to the class of the 
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so-called micro-simulation models [23]. 
This model was developed and is used by 
the German Federal Ministry of Finance 
to evaluate different proposals regarding 
the reform of the income tax of individu-
als. Its advantage is the total inclusion of 
all taxpayers with the above-threshold in-
come, which makes it possible to conduct 
calculation experiments even for the most 
selective reforms. Its drawback is the ab-
sence of information necessary for model-
ing the behavioral reactions of taxpayers 
to the changes in taxation. 
Various models of the progressive 
scale of the income tax based on the 
principle of multiplicator-accelerator re-
main relevant. It is believed that in the 
cases of non-linear progressive taxation, 
an increase of tax rates could destabilize 
economic growth [24]. The advantage of 
such models is that they demonstrate con-
ditions for stable growth as a “corridor” 
of parameter values for the fiscal regime 
of stability and such findings can thus be 
used in policy-making.
There is also vast research literature 
focusing on the risks associated with tax 
reforms. Currently there are various defi-
nitions of this concept (for more detail 
see [25; 26]). In spite of the multitude of 
approaches to their interpretation, all au-
thors agree that tax risks are caused by the 
uncertainty of both external and internal 
environment, they are connected with the 
threat of financial and other losses for the 
state and taxpayers, they have a negative 
character and are rather hard to identify 
and to assess [27].
Causes of uncertainty include the fol-
lowing categories of risks [28]: information 
risks connected with different interpreta-
tions of legislative acts; risks associated 
with tax liabilities (managerial mistakes, 
drawbacks of the document flow, portfolio 
risks, etc.); risks of the environment result-
ing from uncertainties in the enforcement 
of tax legislation; and reputational risks, 
that is, adverse impacts on reputation of 
companies. Some authors extend this list 
to include risks of financial accounting 
and management [29]. Moreover, many 
researchers believe that tax risks result 
from the great tax burden, which makes 
taxpayers try to evade their tax obliga-
tions and thus contributes to the growth 
of the shadow economy [30; 31]. This is 
the key argument of those who advocate 
the flat scale of the income tax on natural 
persons when discussing the choice of a 
taxation system for Russia. Specifically, 
the Russian government has rejected all 
the draft laws for changing the taxation 
system pointing out the negative experi-
ence of 1992–2000 when the progressive 
scale of tax rates was used in Russia. These 
negative effects included difficulties of ad-
ministrating and the attempts of taxpay-
ers (both employers and employees) to 
reduce the tax burden by minimizing the 
paid (received) income. Furthermore, the 
government maintained that the introduc-
tion of the flat scale of income tax on natu-
ral persons in 2001 contributed not only to 
the increase of tax revenue, but also to the 
stabilization of tax collection. 
We share the view of L. Lykova [32], 
who examined the possibility of restoring 
the personal income tax in Russia and of-
fered a quantitative evaluation of the pos-
sible results of this step for three hypothet-
ical scenarios of the reform. In particular, 
she shows the drawbacks of the existing 
statistical information and models the in-
come distribution curve. The calculations 
of the budgetary revenue and the decile 
coefficient demonstrated that none of the 
three scenarios ensures a considerable 
reduction in the decile coefficient, which 
supports the conclusion of the previous 
studies that showed the weak redistribu-
tion function of the personal income tax. 
I. Mayburov and A. Kireenko [33] 
discuss the influence of election cycles on 
the Russian tax system and show that the 
tax burden on the main elements of GDP 
increases during the first years of the po-
litical cycle and decreases during its last 
years. Thus, in the pre-election period, 
the nominal tax burden on the economy 
is constantly decreasing, in the election 
year and the following year of the election 
cycle the effective rates of revenue, con-
sumption and labor rise; these effective 
tax rates go down in the following years. 
Consequently, the starting date of the tax 
reforms is crucial for their implementa-
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tion and the choice of this date should take 
into account the beginning of the election 
cycle. 
In the following sections of the ar-
ticle we are going to combine some of 
the above-mentioned aspects of taxation 
within the framework of a single analyti-
cal scheme which would include the real 
projected parameters of reforms and mod-
el constructions. 
3. The three-parameter model  
of the progressive personal income tax
We use a three-parameter model 
to evaluate the expediency of introduc-
ing the progressive personal income tax. 
In this case, the model scheme will take 
into account the three key parameters – 
social (assets ratio), fiscal (growth in tax 
revenue), and behavioral (the degree of 
the project’s feasibility). In other words, 
it is expected that the introduction of the 
progressive personal income tax should 
lead to a reduction in the assets ratio and 
growth in tax revenue. It is also important 
to take into consideration the risk that the 
reform will fail, that is, it will not reach 
the desired effect. The main idea of this 
scheme is that the calculations should be 
based on these three parameters. Let us 
take a closer look at all the dependences 
that would be used further. 
The initial value of the assets ratio, 
that is, before the progressive scale of the 
personal income tax is introduced, is cal-
culated in a rather trivial way:
=
10
0
1
,DF
D  
(1)
where D1 and D10 signify the income of the 
1st and the 10th decile groups. 
The initial value of tax revenues from 
the personal income tax could be evalu-
ated by the following simplified equation: 
α= −0 ,T D V  (2)
where D is the population’s aggregate in-
come; α is the basic rate of the personal in-
come tax1; and V is the tax benefits.
Then the assets ratio after the intro-
duction of the progressive personal in-
come tax is calculated as:
1 In the existing system of flat taxation α = 13%.
=
*
10
1 *
1
,DF
D  
(3)
where *1D , 
*
10D  stand for the aggregate in-
come of the 1st and the 10th decile groups 
after the introduction of the progressive 
scale of the personal income tax. 
In the simplest case it is possible to 
neglect the tax benefits (V = 0). Then the 
whole effect of the tax reform is deter-
mined by the new value (after the intro-
duction of the progressive personal in-
come tax) of the income of the 10th decile 
group *10D :
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1
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where Wmax is the maximum income for 
the basic rate of taxation (α); L10 is the size 
of the 10th decile group; L10, i is the size of 
the i subgroup of the 10th decile group; 
βi and βj is the tax rate of the i and the j 
subgroups of the 10th decile group, corre-
spondingly; W10, j, max is the upper income 
threshold of the j subgroup of the 10th de-
cile group; W10, i, min and W10, j, min are the 
lower income threshold of the i and the 
j subgroups of the 10th decile group, cor-
respondingly; 10.iW  is the average income 
of the i subgroup of the 10th decile group; 
= ;1,i n  = ;1,j n  n = 5.
The volume of tax revenues from the 
personal income tax after the introduction 
of the progressive scale is calculated ac-
cording to the formula: 
1
1
10. 10. , max 10. , min
2 1
10. 10. , min 10.
1
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∑ ∑
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(5)
For further analysis, it is necessary to 
evaluate the two parameters mentioned 
above: the change of the assets ratio af-
ter the introduction of the progressive 
scale
∆ = −1 0 ,F F F  (6)
(4)
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and the absolute and the relative change 
of tax revenues regarding the personal in-
come tax
∆ = −1 0 ,T T T  (7)
λ = ∆ − ⋅0( / 1) 100%.T T  (8)
To compare different scenarios of the 
tax reform, criteria (6) and (8) can be ag-
gregated into one with the help of mass 
coefficients ζ and 1 – ζ. Then it is possible 
to use the simplest convolution equation: 
(1 ) ,Q Fζλ ζ= + − ∆  (9)
where ζ is the mass coefficient.
To compare the scenarios in which the 
progressive scale is introduced with that 
of changing the flat scale, it is sufficient to 
evaluate the tax revenues for the second 
case according to the equation:
α= −1 * *,T D V  (10)
where α* is the new flat rate of the per-
sonal income tax. 
However, even the combination of 
the fiscal and social effects does not allow 
us to determine the best reform scenario 
as we need to take into account one more 
important parameter – risk (R). Risk in 
this case is understood as the probabil-
ity that the scenario will not in practice 
provide the desired effect. In this sense, 
integral effect Q acts as the potential effect 
that could be reached fully or partially in 
the implementation of the project. Thus, 
to make a decision regarding the expedi-
ency of the project, it is necessary to have 
one more project feature – the size of the 
risk of its fulfillment/non-fulfillment. The 
combination of the potential effect with 
the rate of risk makes it possible to assess 
the factual (real) effect. 
At the qualitative level, it is evident 
that the government’s project and the 
project proposed by the PJR include a low 
risk; the CPRF project, a medium risk; and 
the LDPR project, a high risk. However, 
this rough estimate of risk does not allow 
for a correct comparison of these projects, 
which differ considerably in the size of 
their potential effect. To do this, a concrete 
index of risk R is needed, with its specific 
quantitative value. This index could be 
used to range the projects of the personal 
income tax reforms on the basis of the ag-
gregate criteria of result E. 
Theoretically, the aggregate criterion 
E could be set in the additive and the mul-
tiplicative form. In instrumental terms, the 
multiplicative criterion is preferable and 
could be written the following way: 
= −(1 ),E Q R  (11)
where the potential fiscal-social effect 
Q is corrected by the factor of reliability 
D = 1 – R, which is the measure reverse to 
risk R. It is easy to see that the reliability 
coefficient D acts as some kind of efficien-
cy coefficient. Thus, equation (11) includes 
a maximally transparent interpretation of 
the modeled process: the final effect is the 
value of the potential effect with the as-
sessment of the efficiency coefficient of the 
given reform scenario. 
The equations we applied above make 
it possible to accurately determine the so-
cial and fiscal results of both scenarios 
with different progressive scales of the 
personal income tax and the scenarios of 
simply changing the flat scale. 
4. Initial data for modeling 
All macroeconomic evaluations of tax 
effects, as a rule, are relative and are not 
supposed to be highly precise. However, 
our task in this case is to make our calcu-
lations as accurate as possible to under-
stand the comparative effect of different 
scales – the flat one and the progressive 
one. To achieve this, it is necessary to pre-
pare the initial data for macro-calculations 
very thoroughly. Below we present the 
algorithm of calibrating the statistical ag-
gregates and their “corrected” values that 
will let us obtain non-contradictory results 
in the future. 
The first set is the data on the distribu-
tion of the population’s incomes broken 
into groups, each comprising 10% (Ta-
ble 1). To balance all values, the last col-
umn of Table 1 is calculated as the product 
of columns 3 and 4, which led to a small 
error compared with the Rosstat data. 
We can also  use the information on 
the distribution of the population’s in-
comes by social groups to look at income 
intervals (Table 2). 
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Table 1 
Distribution of monetary income by 10% groups of the population in 2016 
Income 
groups
Share of the group in the total 
volume of the population’s 
monetary income, %*
Size of the 
group,  
ths. people
Average monetary 
income per capita, 
RUB per month*
Monetary income 
of the group  
in 2016, RUB
First 1.9% 14,680,400 5,983 1,053,993,998,400
Second 3.4% 14,680,400 10,368 1,826,476,646,400
Third 4.5% 14,680,400 13,704 2,414,162,419,200
Fourth 5.6% 14,680,400 17,107 3,013,651,233,600
Fifth 6.8% 14,680,400 20,875 3,677,440,200,000
Sixth 8.2% 14,680,400 25,313 4,459,259,582,400
Seventh 10.0% 14,680,400 30,903 5,444,020,814,400
Eighth 12.6% 14,680,400 38,632 6,805,598,553,600
Ninth 16.7% 14,680,400 51,305 9,038,135,064,000
Tenth 30.3% 14,680,400 93,253 16,427,896,094,400
Total – 146,804,000 – 54,160,634,606,400
* See: Social position and living standards of the population – 2017, Table 6.3.
Table 2
Distribution of the population’s income by social groups with account  
for income intervals, 2016 
Average monetary 
income per capita per 
month, RUB*
Boundaries of the average 
monetary income per capita 
per year, RUB
Distribution of the 
population by income 
groups, %*
Size of social 
groups, people
below 7,000 below 84,000 6.0% 8,808,240
7,000.1–100,000 84,000–120,000 7.9% 11,597,516
10,000.1–14,000.0 120,000–168,000 12.0% 17,616,480
14,000.1–19,000.0 168,000–228,000 14.3% 20,992,972
19,000.1–27,000.0 228,000–324,000 18.2% 26,718,328
27,000.1–45,000.0 324,000–540,000 22.7% 33,324,508
45,000.1–60,000.0 540,000–720,000 8.5% 12,478,340
over 60,000.1 over 720,000 10.4% 15,267,616
Total  – – 146,804,000
* See: Social position and living standards of the population – 2017, Table 6.3.
We can compile the final decile table 
of the population’s income (Table 3) by 
combining the data from Table 1 and 
Table 2 with the standard formula of cal-
culating deciles2. The values from Table 3 
will be used at a later stage of our research 
to verify the two basic conditions of cali-
brating calculations. 
The key principle in modeling the in-
troduction of new tax scales and its results 
is that changes in taxation affect only two 
decile groups – the first and the tenth. The 
first is affected through tax benefits and re-
duction/abolition of the personal income 
tax rate; the tenth, through the introduc-
2 See: https://studfiles.net/preview/ 
5316597/page:4/
tion of the progressive personal income 
tax scale. Thus, eight decile groups do not 
take part in our calculations and do not 
influence the final calculations. Besides, 
the tenth decile is broken into five income 
groups, and the data for these groups are 
provided by the official web-site of the 
State Duma3.
Furthermore, the tax system in Russia 
deals with the so-called taxpayer, while 
the data in Table 3 encompass the whole 
population of the country, including non-
working groups. Therefore, in Table 3 we 
need to focus on the average income of 
the taxpayer: the average income of the 
3 See: http://sozd.parlament.gov.ru/bill/ 
427315-7
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population is corrected with the help of 
the coefficient that takes into account the 
share of the adult population4, which ac-
counts for 78% of the total population. To 
simplify the analysis, it is assumed that 
this share is the same for all decile groups, 
each of them is reduced by this value, and 
afterwards the taxpayer’s average income 
is calculated again. 
The first condition of calibration is used 
to evaluate the average income of the 
lower income group of the 10th decile: 
W9 < W10.1, that is, the average income of 
even the lowest subgroup of the top decile 
cannot be smaller than the average income 
of the previous decile group. If we conduct 
calculations of this parameter for the sub-
group 10.1 using the rule of the arithmetic 
mean, as the analysts of all major political 
parties – CPRF, LDPR and PJR – do, the 
above-mentioned condition will not be 
observed. It happens because the distribu-
tion of income inside the income group is 
configured in such a way that it is heav-
ily left-weighted – to the lower boundary 
of income, while common averaging pre-
supposes the concentration of taxpayers 
in the middle of the income interval or its 
even distribution over the whole income 
interval. Such simplification could result 
in serious calculation errors in the calcu-
lation of the socio-economic effect from 
4 According to the methodology of the World 
Inequality Lab, we shall assume that the adult 
population are people aged 20 and over.
Table 3
Decile table of the population’s income, 2016 
Decile Boundaries of the 
average per capita 
income per year, 
RUB 
Size of 
the group, 
people
Average per 
capita income 
per month, 
RUB
Average per 
capita income 
per year, RUB 
Income of the 
group per year, 
RUB 
First 0–102,228 14,680,400 5,983 71,796 1,053,993,998,400
Second 102,228–144,400 14,680,400 10,368 124,416 1,826,476,646,400
Third 144,400–184,400 14,680,400 13,704 164,448 2,414,162,419,200
Fourth 184,400–227,161 14,680,400 17,107 205,284 3,013,651,233,600
Fifth 227,161–269,119 14,680,400 20,875 250,500 3,677,440,200,000
Sixth 269,119–332,440 14,680,400 25,313 303,756 4,459,259,582,400
Seventh 332,440–385,187 14,680,400 30,903 370,836 5,444,020,814,400
Eighth 385,187–529,533 14,680,400 38,632 463,584 6,805,598,553,600
Ninth 529,533–728,471 14,680,400 51,305 615,660 9,038,135,064,000
Tenth over 728,471 14,680,400 93,253 1,119,036 16,427,896,094,400
Assets ratio 15.6 54,160,634,606,400
the introduction of the proposed scales of 
the progressive personal income tax (this 
question will be discussed in more detail 
further). 
Thus, we need to deal with the prob-
lem of defining the corrective effect of the 
coefficient for the calculation of the aver-
age income of the 10th decile’s subgroups. 
Let us suppose that the average per capita 
income in the lower subgroup of the 10th 
decile, that is, in subgroup 10.1, should 
be at least 5% higher than the average 
income of the 9th decile. Then it equals 
65,5345· 1.05 = 68,810 RUB per month, or 
825,728 RUB per year. Based on this, it is 
easy to determine the aggregate income 
of subgroup 10.1 (D10.1) as the product of 
the size of the group (L10.1) and the aver-
age income (W10.1), that is, D10.1 = W10.1 · L10.1. 
After that, the corrective coefficient (k) 
is calculated according to the formula of 
aggregation of the income boundaries: 
k = (W10.1, max + W10.1, min) / W10.1. The calcu-
lations produce the coefficient k = 4.52.
The obtained numerical value is 
highly significant due to its considerable 
difference from the standard correction 
coefficient k = 2. It means that all the ex-
isting applied macro-assessments of the 
budgetary income from the introduction 
of the progressive personal income tax 
are overestimated 1.5–2 times due to the 
5 The re-calculation was carried out for the 
adult population.
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incorrect distribution of taxpayers inside 
the high-income subgroups. 
For other subgroups of the 10th de-
cile, the aggregate income is calculated as 
the difference of the income of the whole 
decile group and the income of the lower 
subgroup (10.1). Afterwards, their com-
mon correction coefficient is calculated ac-
cording to the following equation: 
5
10, , 10, ,
10,
10 10.12
,i min i maxi
i
W W
k L
D D
=
+
=
−
∑
  
(12)
where D10 is the aggregate income of the 
10th decile group and D10.1 is the aggregate 
income of the lower subgroup of the 10th 
decile group. 
The result of our calculation is a com-
mon value for the correction coefficient 
k = 3,56. However, with the values we have 
for group 10.4, the second condition of calibra-
tion is violated: W10.4, min < W10.4 < W10.4, max. 
According to this condition, the average 
income of the subgroup should be within 
the corresponding income intervals. Such 
violation of the boundaries of the intervals 
is unacceptable and requires additional 
correction, which is done with the help of 
an expert review with the consequent re-
distribution of income of subgroup 10.4 
in favor of subgroup 10.5. The final cor-
rection coefficients for the subgroups look 
the following way: k10.1 = 4.52; k10.2 = 3.56; 
k10.3 = 3.56; k10.4 = 2.90; k10.5 = 3.99.
To illustrate the calibration conditions 
(12), let us examine Figure 1, which shows 
different distributions of taxpayers inside 
the income subgroup of the high income 
group. An evident simplification of this 
scheme is the linear character of the dis-
tribution function L(W). However, instead 
of a horizontal line corresponding to the 
hypothesis of averaging the subgroup’s 
income, this straight line changes its angle 
and thus shows where the greatest tax-
payer mass is concentrated; the area of the 
figure does not change because the total 
volume of the subgroup’s income does 
not change. 
 
k < 2 
k = 2 
k > 2 
Income, W   
Population
size, L(W) 
W10, i, min  W10, i, mix  
Figure 1. Distribution of the population inside income groups of the 10th decile
Table 4
Initial data on the incomes of high-come population groups, 2016
Decile 
groups and 
subgroups
Size of 
subgroups, 
people
Lower boundary 
of the annual 
income, RUB
Higher boundary 
of the annual 
income, RUB
Income of the 
group
Average annual 
income of the 
taxpayer, RUB
First 11,493,000 0* 102,230* 1,053,993,998,400 91,707
Ninth 11,493,000 529,533* 728,471* 9,038,135,064,000 786,403
Tenth 11,493,000 728,471** – 16,427,896,094,400 1,429,383
10.1 11,008,820 728,471 3,000,000 9,090,246,885,680 825,724
10.2 448,800 3,000,000 10,000,000 1,637,055,302,221 3,647,628
10.3 34,369 10,000,000 500,000,000 4,918,177,769,408 143,099,240
10.4 587 500,000,000 1,000,000,000 303,620,689,655 517,241,379
10.5 424 1,000,000,000 – 478,795,447,436 1,129,234,546
* Data for the whole population.
** Data used both for the whole population and for the taxpayer. 
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As a result of our correction calcula-
tions, we now can form the initial data suf-
ficient to assess the feasibility of introduc-
ing the progressive personal income tax in 
Russia (Table 4). 
5. Expert risk assessment  
of the tax reform scenarios 
The main risk of all tax reform scenar-
ios is that the planned budgetary revenue 
will not be accumulated, consequently, the 
incomes of high-income groups will not 
be duly reduced and neither will social in-
equality. Keeping this in mind, we suggest 
a procedure of expert poll aimed at clari-
fying the feasibility degree of each of the 
four scenarios of the personal income tax 
reform. Our questionnaire consists of just 
one question supplied with a methodolog-
ical commentary for the surveyed experts: 
“Currently there are three scenarios of re-
forming the income tax system in Russian 
public discourse, presented by three polit-
ical parties and based on the introduction 
of the progressive scale of taxation. More-
over, there is an alternative scenario pro-
posed by the government, based on keep-
ing the flat scale of the income tax with an 
insignificant increase of the tax rate (from 
13 to 15%). Please give your expert opin-
ion on the degree of feasibility of each of 
the four reform scenarios, taking into con-
sideration that the increase of the tax rate 
will provoke tax evasion (last column of 
the Table). Your assessment should be on 
the scale from 0 to 100%, where 0 means 
that the consolidated budget will receive 
no additional revenue, and 100 means that 
the budget will receive the whole planned 
additional revenue”.
To simplify the assessment, the ex-
perts were given a table with a brief de-
scription of the four reform scenarios. 
Averaged assessments of the poll and the 
additional statistical characteristics are 
presented in Table 5. 
Our poll was of experimental char-
acter and included only 15 Russian eco-
nomic experts specializing in taxation and 
taxation risks. The experts included repre-
sentatives from the Ural Federal Universi-
ty, Southern Federal University, Financial 
University under the Government of the 
Russian Federation, and the Central Eco-
nomics and Mathematics Institute of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences. 
Table 5
Parameters of the four personal income tax reform scenarios in Russia
Scenario Annual income inter-
val, RUB
Tax rate Feasibility 
degree of the 
scenario, (D), 
in % (from  
0 to 100)
Range 
of 
assess-
ments
Polari-
zation 
coeffi-
cient
Lower 
boundary
Upper 
boundary
CPRF 0 100,000 5% 28.3 10–40 30
100,001 3,000,000 5,000 RUB + 13% from the 
sum over 100,000 RUB
3,000,001 10,000,000 382,000 RUB + 18% from the 
sum over 3,000,000 RUB
10,000,001 – 1,642,000 RUB + 25% from the 
sum over 10,000,000 RUB
LDPR 0 180,000 0% 8.3 0–20 20
180,001 2,400,000 13% from the sum over 
180,000 RUB
2,400,001 100,000,000 288.6 ths. RUB + 30% from the 
sum over 2,400,000 RUB
100,000,001 – 29,568.6 ths. RUB + 70% from 
the sum over 100,000,000 RUB
PJR 0 24,000,000 13% 51.7 15–80 65
24,000,001 – 3,120 ths. RUB + 18% from the 
sum over 24,000,000 RUB
Govern-
mental
Rate increase from 13 
to 15%
All categories of the population 
except for the poorest groups 
98.4 95–100 5
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The analysis of Table 2 shows that, ac-
cording to all our experts, the most reliable 
is the scenario suggested by government, 
while the most unrealistic and unachiev-
able one is the rather radical project of the 
LDPR. Compared to it, the CPRF project 
is more realistic, while the PJR project is 
even more feasible. The coefficient of po-
larization, understood as the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum 
assessments of the experts, showed that the 
smallest discord of opinions characterized 
the government’s project, and the greatest – 
that of the PJR. Disagreement among the 
experts about the PJR scenario is explained 
by the fact that this scenario is riddled with 
contradictions in the sense that it proposes 
a transition from the flat to the progressive 
scale of the personal income tax, but at the 
same time uses very modest quantitative 
assessments and has all the features of a 
“palliative” medium scenario which will 
not bring any noticeable social changes. 
The results of expert assessments 
shown in Table 5 are very important for 
understanding the true scale of the prob-
lem of tax reforms. For example, there is 
an almost 12 times difference between the 
tax collection in the government’s project 
and the LDPR project, which shows how 
hard it is to ensure an efficient transition 
from the flat to the progressive scale. Such 
figures unequivocally point to the fact that 
the establishment of a new scale of the 
income tax on natural persons will most 
likely be accompanied by a sharp drop in 
tax collection. 
It should be noted that due to the lack 
of reliable statistical data on the feasibil-
ity of these scenarios, there is practically 
no other way to assess the project’s risks 
but to conduct an expert poll. No model 
constructions can give help us asses the 
project’s risks based on the available sta-
tistical data. Meanwhile, the questionnaire 
survey enables us to use the experience 
and intuition of experts, who in many 
cases very accurately predict the results of 
future reforms. If the experts are carefully 
selected and their number is maximized 
(for example, 100–150 people), it is possi-
ble to achieve a sufficiently high accuracy 
of assessment. If necessary, it is possible to 
use the procedure of open group discus-
sion and to obtain a series of group assess-
ments, each be based on consensus. 
6. Results of analytical calculations 
In the previous sections we have pre-
sented results of the preparatory analysis 
of different reform scenarios. In this sec-
tion, we are going to describe the ana-
lytical calculations which would allow 
us to obtain practically relevant results. 
To achieve this, we will use the convolu-
tion of criteria (9) and obtain the integral 
evaluation of the scenario based on two 
parameters – social and fiscal. To calcu-
late the mass coefficient ζ, we are going 
to assume that the fiscal and social effects 
of the four scenarios shown in Table 5 are 
equal in sum. Then the condition for the 
calculation of the mass coefficient will 
look the following way: 
4 4
1 1
(1 ) ,j j
j j
Fζ λ ζ
= =
= − ∆∑ ∑
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where j is the index of the tax reform proj-
ect (four projects in total). 
The calculations give us the mass co-
efficient ζ = 0.153. Then integral criterion 
(9) for the evaluation of each project will 
look the following way:
0.153 0.847 ,Q Fλ= + ∆  (14)
The calculations based on equation 
(14) make it possible to describe a single 
fiscal-social result of the scenarios (Table 6). 
Table 6
Fiscal-social result of the reform 
Scenarios Social inequality Revenues of the state
Assets ratio 
(F)
Change of the assets 
ratio (∆F)
Absolute increment 
(∆T), trillion RUB
Relative increment 
(λ), %
CPRF 13.7 –1.9 0.49 7.0%
LDPR 12.4 –3.2 1.02 14.5%
PJR 15.3 –0.3 0.27 3.8%
Governmental 15.6 0.0 1.08 15.4%
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With the help of the expert assess-
ments of the projects’ feasibility we can 
now calculate the cumulative effect (11): 
E = QD. In this case, index D is calculated 
as a share (D < 1) and, as it has already 
been mentioned, acts as a kind of efficien-
cy coefficient. The results of applied calcu-
lations are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7
Generalized assessment of the scenarios 
Scenario Integral 
criterion 
(Q)
Feasibility 
degree (D)
Generalized 
assessment 
(E)
CPRF 2.68 0.283 0.76
LDPR 4.93 0.083 0.41
PJR 0.83 0.517 0.43
GRF 2.36 0.984 2.32
The expert evaluations make it possi-
ble to range the reform projects by the val-
ue of the expected actual (real) fiscal-social 
effect E. In particular, there are interesting 
shifts between the governmental, CPRF 
and LDPR projects. The four projects had 
the following rating by integral criterion 
Q: LDPR – 1, CPRF – 2, governmental – 3, 
PJR – 4. If we apply the generalized as-
sessment criterion, however, the hierar-
chy of projects looks completely different: 
LDPR – 4, CPRF – 2, governmental – 1, 
PJR – 3. Thus, the LDPR project, which 
was the most preferable in terms of its po-
tential effect, dropped to the bottom of the 
list when the risk of non-collection of taxes 
was taken into account, while the govern-
mental project, on the contrary, rose from 
the third to the first place. At the same 
time, the PJR project slightly improved its 
position and moved from the last to the 
third place, while the CPRF kept its sec-
ond place. 
It is necessary to pay attention to the 
fact that the hierarchy of priorities es-
tablished earlier [34] and based on the 
simple qualitative risk assessment of the 
projects was exactly the same as the hi-
erarchy based on the quantitative proce-
dure that used the experts’ evaluations, 
which proves the accuracy and relevance 
of our results. It means, in fact, that our 
qualitative assessment of the projects’ 
risks matched the quantitative assessment 
obtained after the expert poll. Obviously, 
this methodology could be used in the 
future to conduct two-stage assessment 
of projects’ risks, with the first step con-
sisting of a rough qualitative assessment, 
which is specified, if necessary, at the sec-
ond stage by a more precise quantitative 
evaluation. 
These macroeconomic assessments 
lead us to the following conclusions. 
Firstly, the results of introducing a 
progressive personal income tax scale are 
much more modest than it was declared 
in the analytical notes of the political par-
ties. For example, the additional revenue 
from the reforms, according to the CPRF, 
should be 1.15 trillion rubles6, while our 
assessment shows that it is 2.3 times 
smaller. It should be noted that the initial 
data for our calculations and those carried 
out by the CPRF were practically identi-
cal, so the results are comparable without 
any special reservations. This fact testifies 
to the existence of serious methodological 
drawbacks in the simplified macroeco-
nomic calculations of the CPRF analysts. 
The assessment of additional revenue in 
the LDPR project was 2.05 trillion rubles7, 
which also exceeds by two times our as-
sessment. Finally, the sum of 0.20 trillion 
rubles8 indicated in the PJR project is, on 
the contrary, 35% less than our final as-
sessment. 
Secondly, the above-mentioned over-
estimation of the additional revenue from 
the tax reform makes it possible to con-
clude that it is important to adjust the ini-
tial data as we did in the previous section 
of this article because otherwise the final 
figures may be significantly distorted. The 
main source of the emerging aberrations 
is that the analysists’ flawed understand-
ing of the population distribution inside 
income groups. Thus, the analytical mate-
rials of three parties were based on simple 
averaging of the income relative to the 
boundaries of the income group and it 
was thus assumed that almost all taxpay-
6 See: http://sozd.parlament.gov.ru/
bill/427315-7
7 See: http://sozd.parlament.gov.ru/
bill/1148107-6
8 See: http://sozd.parlament.gov.ru/
bill/384276-7
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ers are either concentrated in the middle 
of the income interval or are evenly dis-
tributed inside it. We believe, however, 
that the actual pattern may be different: 
most members of the income group have 
incomes that are close to the left bound-
ary of the income interval. This distribu-
tion with a concentration in the left part 
is rather natural: the higher is the income, 
the fewer people have it. This pattern is 
true not only for the intergroup distribu-
tion, but also inside the groups, including 
high income subgroups. This fact should 
be taken into account in all the subsequent 
macro-calculations of fiscal effects. 
Thirdly, the “soft” options of the pro-
gressive personal income tax scale are of 
no macroeconomic interest. Thus, for the 
PJR project the income disparity reduction 
effect is microscopic and will be impercep-
tible in real life; the increase in state rev-
enue will be less than 4% from the current 
level of the personal income tax collection, 
which will have practically no effect on 
the size and stability of the country’s bud-
get. Taking into account the transforma-
tional expenses for changing the flat sys-
tem and the high transactional expenses 
of the tax system in the future, we can as-
sert with certainty that this scenario of the 
tax reform is pointless. The efforts needed 
for the readjustment of the tax system 
will look hollow in view of the presented 
modest economic results. The LDPR proj-
ect looks more radical and interesting: 
compared with the project of “Just Rus-
sia”, it is likely to bring about a 10 times 
greater social effect in terms of disparity 
reduction. Moreover, it can increase the 
tax collection 4 times. The CPRF project is 
interim and too cautious to be viewed as a 
scenario of a serious reform. 
Fourthly, the fiscal potential of re-
forming the flat scale by increasing the 
rate from 13 to 15% is much higher than 
the potential of the progressive scale. This 
scenario results in more gains in tax rev-
enue than the LDPR project, and certainly 
the other two projects. Thus, a minimal 
transformation of the tax system with the 
preservation of a flat scale can exceed the 
fiscal results predicted within even the 
most radical scenario of manipulating the 
progressive scale. This circumstance casts 
serious doubt on the feasibility of a large-
scale reform and transition to a progres-
sive scale. The weakness of increasing the 
flat scale’s rate is its neutrality related to 
social inequality, which does not change 
in this scenario. 
Finally, the shifts in the rating system 
of the projects convincingly show that the 
risk factor is a significant element in the 
decision-making system and that it can 
radically change the regulator’s prefer-
ences. Moreover, the volatility of the risk 
factor is much higher than the volatility 
of the fiscal-social effect. Our calculations 
show that the maximum gap in the inte-
gral effect (Q) between the LDPR and the 
PJR projects was almost 6 times, while a 
similar gap in the feasibility criterion (D) 
between the PJR and the governmental 
projects reached 12 times. Thus, the dif-
ferences between the projects are mostly 
connected with the group of risk factors 
rather than the potential of tax revenues 
or the reduction of income disparity. 
7. Conclusion
In this article we have presented a 
range of analytical approaches to the 
evaluation of tax reforms, which can be 
considered as a first step in the develop-
ment of applied instruments for assess-
ment of reform projects. In this case, we 
took into account the social effect as the 
assets ratio, but in a more general case, 
the introduction of the progressive scale 
could affect not only the tenth, but also 
other decile groups. Thus, in more gener-
al calculations it is necessary to switch to 
the assessment of the social effect though 
the Gini index. 
Furthermore, the reforms we exam-
ined were one-step while according to 
modern requirements, a serious reform 
should be multi-step [35], which means 
that the introduction of the progressive 
personal income tax should be extended 
for a period of over 10 years. Certain ele-
ments of the new system should be intro-
duced every two or three years, which will 
allow the government to avoid any radi-
cal social shocks. For such an “extended” 
reform, it makes sense to evaluate the cu-
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mulative effects for the ten years of trans-
formation. 
If we generalize the scheme of ana-
lytical calculations and take into account 
the expanding social groups affected by 
the reform and the reform period, we still 
will be able to apply the three-parameter 
scheme of reform projects. 
Calculations presented in this article 
showed that the scenarios of the personal 
income tax reform are designed in such a 
way that they do not lead to any serious 
fiscal or social short-term gains. It would 
be wrong, however, to conclude that the 
introduction of the progressive personal 
income tax is not feasible. Undoubtedly 
Russia, with its class of super-rich people, 
should introduce a reasonable progressive 
personal income tax system. At present, 
however, there are two key conditions to 
make such a reform possible: the availabil-
ity of adequate and timely information on 
the incomes of all citizens and a balanced 
reform project. The first condition cannot 
be met at the current stage, but the rapid 
digitization of tax accounting gives hope 
for radical improvements in income statis-
tics in the nearest future. The second con-
dition cannot be met either as there is no 
fruitful cooperation between those politi-
cal parties that support the introduction 
of the tax and the expert community that 
could develop such project. The fate of the 
personal income tax reform depends on 
how successfully Russia will manage to 
address these issues. 
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